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I INTRODUCTION 
Many financial services, including the provision of short-term credit, have been 
acknowledged as essential services.[1] Exclusion from such services can be described as 
‘financial exclusion’, which can itself lead to ‘social exclusion’, in the sense of being denied 
full participation in society. This article explores the term ‘financial exclusion’ in the 
Australian context and considers the extent to which the current regulatory structure for 
financial institutions in Australia assists in addressing it.  
In Part II we describe the nature of financial exclusion in Australia, including the extent of 
exclusion, its causes and its consequences. We focus particularly on the consumer credit 
market. In Australia, there are not large groups of people who would be regarded as 
‘unbanked’ with no engagement with the financial system whatsoever, as has been found to 
be the case in the UK. Financial exclusion in the Australian context can therefore best be 
defined in terms of lack of access to mainstream financial services. Those excluded from 
mainstream financial services may turn to alternative service providers, being either ‘fringe’ 
credit providers or the community sector. Organisations within the community sector offer 
fair financial products to those who cannot access the mainstream market; however, they are 
able to do so only on a limited scale. The financial products offered in the fringe market tend 
to be expensive and have been described as exploitative and ‘unsafe’. While some 
mainstream institutions have started to extend their services to those previously excluded 
from mainstream short-term credit services, these pilot schemes have not been sufficient in 
terms of size or geography to satisfy the potential demand. 
Part III begins by considering the shortcomings of consumer protection theory that 
emphasises competitive markets and disclosure regulation. The resulting legislation is 
ineffective to discourage financial exclusion. There is no competition to provide services for 
the financially excluded, who may be regarded as too great a risk by mainstream service 
providers. Requiring the disclosure of fees and charges to borrowers with no alternative but 
to pay exorbitant charges and interest for a loan is likely to have little or no impact upon their 
decision to proceed with the loan. This is exemplified by the growth of the fringe credit 
market. We consider whether it would be possible to regulate fringe credit providers to 
provide loans on reasonable and fair terms, but suggest that the reliance on disclosure 
regulation in relation to fringe credit is an inadequate regulatory response and that ‘command 
and control’ models of regulation are likely to be necessary in regulating the fringe sector. 
In Part IV we consider the ways in which the current regulatory structure for financial 
institutions in Australia hinders financial institutions from addressing financial exclusion. 
Firstly, we note that in Australia credit unions are regulated as if they were banks, ignoring 
their mutual natures and their potential to contribute to tackling financial exclusion by 
offering access to affordable loans to their members. This can be compared with the 
exemption from banking regulation granted to credit unions in the UK. Secondly, we argue 
that the work of community organisations which might potentially infringe current prudential 
regulation needs to be carefully considered, and afforded its own specific regulatory 
framework. Where organisations are concerned to provide loans for social purposes, and have 
demonstrated that by their conduct, a less interventionist regulatory response is called for, 
consistent with the regulatory strategy outlined as part of Ayres and Braithwaite’s 
enforcement pyramid.[2] Finally, we argue that corporate mainstream financial institutions 
such as banks are limited in their ability to address financial exclusion, by the corporate law 
duties on directors to maximise the return of profits to shareholders. In this respect we 
question the effectiveness of voluntary corporate social responsibility as a regulatory 
measure.  
II FINANCIAL EXCLUSION IN AUSTRALIA 
A Defining Financial Exclusion in Australia 
The term ‘financial exclusion’ has been in use since the early to mid-1990s, most widely in 
the government and community sectors in the UK, and has been closely linked to discussions 
on addressing poverty and social exclusion. For example, Chant Link and Associates note 
that ‘[f]inancial exclusion may be either a cause or a consequence of social exclusion, or 
both’.[3] 
There is no commonly agreed definition of financial exclusion. Some commentators take a 
very broad approach - for example, seeing financial exclusion as ‘processes that prevent poor 
and disadvantaged social groups from gaining access to the financial system’.[4] Other 
definitions are more specific, and focus on access (or lack of access) to specific products or 
services. 
To date, most definitions have originated from the UK, in a context where past studies have 
shown that a small, but significant, proportion of consumers have no engagement with the 
financial system.[5] These consumers are the ‘unbanked’, and do not have even a basic 
savings/transactions account. In Australia, however, there is not the same level of complete 
disengagement from the financial system. Data from 2003 suggests that only 0.8% of the 
adult population owned no financial products, and 6% owned only a transaction product and 
no other financial products.[6] Definitions developed in the UK are therefore less applicable 
in Australia.  
Instead, financial exclusion in the Australian credit market can be best understood by 
focusing on a lack of access to the mainstream market (including products offered by banks), 
with its stronger regulatory framework, more established and reputation conscious players, 
and (in general) cheaper products and services. Those who cannot access the mainstream 
market are driven towards the credit products offered in the fringe market (for profit) and the 
community/informal ‘market’[7] (not for profit). Unfortunately, the reach of the 
community/informal market is very small, and most financially excluded consumers will find 
themselves resorting to the high cost and arguably exploitative products available in the 
fringe market. Applying this approach, Chant Link and Associates have suggested that 
financial exclusion in Australia is ‘the lack of access by certain consumers to appropriate low 
cost, fair and safe financial products and services from mainstream providers’.[8] In this 
definition, it is not simply exclusion from the mainstream market that is of concern; elements 
of appropriateness, low cost, fairness and safety of products are also incorporated. As we 
discuss later in this article, these elements are not ones that fit easily into the dominant 
theoretical approach to consumer protection regulation in Australia.  
Financial exclusion is not necessarily absolute, and can be temporary or more permanent.[9] 
In certain circumstances, and in the absence of interventions, consumers with low levels of 
exclusion can be drawn into deeper levels of exclusion.[10]  
B Why is Financial Exclusion of Concern? 
Increasingly, there is recognition that some products and services are ‘essential’ to 
participation in social and economic life in developed economies, and that failure to ensure 
access to these services can have significant consequences for individuals and the broader 
community. This notion is most widely accepted in the case of utility services - including 
energy, water, and telecommunications. In these sectors, governments in Australia and 
elsewhere have imposed universal service obligations, retailer of last resort arrangements, 
pricing controls and/or other regulatory controls to ensure that all members of the community 
are able to access the minimum level of service necessary for full participation.[11]  
Given the centrality of financial services to developed economies like Australia, we argue 
that at least some financial services should also be seen as ‘essential services’. There is 
commentary from the UK to the effect that these essential financial services include, amongst 
other things, access to cash transmission and banking services, as well as short-term 
consumer credit to cover emergencies and smooth out the cost of large purchases.[12] 
As we explained above, financial exclusion results where consumers cannot access these 
essential services from the mainstream market. The consequences can be costly, and can 
create or prolong financial hardship.[13] Connolly and Hajaj have noted that ‘[t]he options 
for operating a household budget without mainstream financial services are more expensive, 
often unregulated and very limiting’.[14]  
For consumers on low incomes, the high cost of credit in the fringe market can in fact impede 
their ability to overcome financial difficulties, and can deplete their income and ability to 
save. The structure of some short-term loans (particularly payday loans) are such that in 
many cases the borrower will not be able to repay the loan at the end of the term, and will 
‘roll-over’ the loan, thus incurring additional fees and costs.[15] The use of high-cost loans 
can also send consumers further into debt spirals from which it becomes difficult to escape: 
as more and more income is used to pay high interest, fees and charges, the likelihood of 
default increases, and the consumer will become further excluded from the mainstream 
market.[16] Bankruptcy, and its attendant individual and social consequences, can become an 
end result.[17]  
Credit from the fringe market can also have a broader social impact. Over-indebted 
consumers on low incomes can place strains on government, community and welfare 
services, as emergency relief is sought to meet the basic living expenses that cannot 
otherwise be met because income is tied up in debt repayment. Other costs are imposed on 
government and community services to provide income support, administer bankruptcy and 
court processes, and/or to respond to the adverse health impacts arising from financial 
exclusion. In addition, 
The money a household spends servicing high-cost debt in the second-tier marketplace is not 
available for spending at the neighbourhood grocery stores, service stations, pharmacies, or 
other local businesses.[18]  
Financial exclusion therefore merits a strong legal, policy and government response.  
C The Extent and Causes of Financial Exclusion 
Despite its importance, there are no accurate estimates of the extent of financial exclusion in 
Australia. Unless a product ownership analysis is used whereby the level of financial 
exclusion is measured in terms of ‘the proportion of the population lacking ownership of any 
(or many) financial products’,[19] levels of financial exclusion are difficult to measure. 
However, even a product ownership approach to measuring financial exclusion is not 
sufficient where the definition of financial exclusion includes gradations and focuses on 
access to ‘appropriate low-cost, fair and safe products’. In this definition, we need to make 
some value judgments about whether particular products are low-cost, fair and safe,[20] and a 
broad-brush product ownership analysis cannot do this.  
The product analysis approach is even more limiting when considering financial exclusion in 
consumer credit. Firstly, there is little data available on ownership of fringe credit 
products.[21] Secondly, the conclusions that can be drawn from high or low levels of credit 
product ownership are not immediately obvious. As the UK Financial Services Authority has 
noted: ‘[m]easuring the number of people who are excluded from credit facilities is difficult, 
as not everyone without credit wants or needs it’.[22] Thirdly, the demand for consumer 
credit is frequently unavoidable for many vulnerable, low-income consumers, but it can also 
raise concerns about the risk of over-indebtedness.[23] This relationship between overcoming 
financial exclusion and reducing over indebtedness can be difficult to resolve.  
While we cannot definitively assess the extent of financial exclusion, many community and 
consumer advocates are concerned that levels of financial exclusion are rising,[24] and see 
consumer credit as the area most in need of attention.[25] 
Reflecting the complexities of this issue of financial exclusion, there is a range of commercial 
and personal factors that drive or cause financial exclusion in consumer credit.  
From a commercial perspective, mainstream institutions have become increasingly reluctant 
to provide consumer credit services to low-income and vulnerable consumers, or to 
consumers with poor credit records. In part, this appears to be driven by a concern that these 
customers are high-risk, and more likely to default on loans. However, we might question 
these assumptions in the light of the repayment rates of this same customer group when using 
community-based no-interest loan schemes.[26]  
Some commentators have suggested that many low-income consumers are seeking loans for 
relatively small amounts, with fixed (affordable) rates and a relatively short time frame for 
repayment.[27] These are precisely the type of loans that are available in the 
community/informal sector. Minus the characteristic of affordability, they are also the type of 
loans available in the fringe market. However, mainstream providers have largely withdrawn 
small loans from the market, perhaps because they are not as profitable as other products,[28] 
and most now have minimum loan amounts of between $1,000 and $5,000.[29] Those 
requesting small loans are directed to credit cards and other sources of open-ended credit.[30] 
These products entail their own risks,[31] and some low-income consumers appear to be 
wary of using them.[32] 
Mainstream providers also fail to meet the service needs and preferences of low income and 
vulnerable consumers. For example, studies have suggested that fringe lending customers 
appreciate the friendlier, more welcoming and respectful service of these lenders compared to 
mainstream institutions,[33] and that mainstream providers have been unable (or unwilling) 
to meet preferences of fringe lending customers for greater speed and accessibility of services 
(ie longer opening hours, street access, face-to-face service) of services.[34] Interestingly, 
Ramsay has suggested that fringe lenders often cultivate ‘fictive friendships’ in order to 
reduce the likelihood of the customer shopping around for a cheaper product.[35] 
Also relevant is the increasing reliance by mainstream providers on automated credit scoring 
systems, which cannot take account of individual circumstances or explanations for defaults. 
In contrast, fringe lenders may be prepared to take a more flexible approach to credit 
histories, and some prominently advertise that poor credit reports or previous bankruptcies 
will not be a barrier to loan approval.[36]  
One of the most frequently mentioned individual drivers of financial exclusion is low income 
or poverty,[37] and there is clearly a circularity of cause and effect between financial 
exclusion and financial hardship or poverty. Having a low income facilitates the need for 
consumer credit, as ‘households on very tight budgets are among those most likely to need to 
borrow, being less likely to have savings safety nets in a case of emergency or to be in a 
position to save towards essential services’.[38] However, having a low income also means 
that mainstream lenders are reluctant to provide finance. Other related factors linked to 
financial exclusion are said to include employment status and housing tenure.[39] 
Evidence that most customers of fringe lenders and community organisations primarily use 
credit to meet daily living expenses, pay bills and cover emergency costs[40] suggests that 
credit plays a role in smoothing out expenses and/or compensating for inadequate incomes. 
Broader measures to reduce poverty are clearly critical in addressing financial exclusion; 
however, analysis of any reform that is needed is beyond the scope of this article. 
III THE SHORTCOMINGS OF DOMINANT CONSUMER PROTECTION 
THEORY IN THE CONTEXT OF FINANCIAL EXCLUSION 
A Consumer Protection Theory 
There are a number of different rationales or theories for consumer protection regulation and, 
in this Part, we explore how the dominant consumer protection ideology behind consumer 
protection regulation in Australia has produced legislation that has little or no capacity to 
discourage financial exclusion. An exposition of the range of theories and models for 
intervention on consumer protection grounds is outside the scope of this paper. However, 
some of the key ideas are outlined. For example, Duggan refers to consumer protection 
measures being applicable to one or more of the following values: welfare considerations, 
equity considerations and ‘paternalism’.[41] In a later paper, he suggests that various 
consumer protection initiatives can be understood as reflecting economic efficiency 
considerations, loss distribution considerations and/or paternalistic concerns.[42] Howells 
suggests that there are broadly three consumer protection rationales for intervention into ‘the 
foundational ideology of contract law’ - that is, freedom of contract[43] - and these are: 
promoting competition, achieving individual justice and realising social justice.[44] And, in 
their development of ‘information-based principles’ for consumer protection policy, Hadfield 
et al focus on an economic conception of the objectives of consumer protection.[45] In 
contrast, Ramsay talks of a ‘third way’ approach to consumer credit regulation, that both 
recognises the importance of the market, and of empowering consumers within that market, 
and also focuses on the relevance of social policy in achieving goals that cannot be met 
relying on the market alone.[46] 
In Australia also, there is a mix of ideologies and models behind consumer protection 
initiatives, and it has been argued that the policy objectives for interventions are often 
inconsistent.[47] However, in recent years, the dominant approach has been to provide 
consumer protection by promoting competition and eliminating market failures. As 
Bourgoignie explains: 
The usual rhetoric in consumer law and policy has as its foremost aim to enable the consumer 
to fully play his [sic] role in the economic market, assigning to him [sic] adequate 
opportunities for choice and negotiation. The predominant conception is therefore 
integrative; it continues to be based on the illusion of the effective sovereignty of the 
consumer in the market.[48]  
In this approach, the understanding is that vigorous competition between traders will promote 
and protect the interests of consumers. Informed consumers will shun traders that overcharge, 
or provide poor quality or service, and transfer their purchasing power to those traders 
offering competitive pricing, quality and service. In this way, consumers will activate the 
competitive process.[49] Rivalry between traders ‘generally provides incentives for least cost 
production and for prices to mirror costs’,[50] to the ultimate benefit of consumers. 
This competition and market-based approach to consumer protection is reflected in current 
government policies and pronouncements. For example, in a recent speech, the Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Treasurer, whose portfolio includes consumer protection, noted: 
the way I see it, the future direction for Australian consumers must be based on two 
important principles. Number one – we have to ensure that real benefits flow to Australian 
consumers from a competitive market. And, two – we have to understand the vital role that 
confident consumers play in actually making the benefits of competition real and 
tangible.[51]  
The focus on competition to provide consumer benefits and consumer protection has also 
resulted in a heavy reliance on disclosure initiatives to protect consumers.[52] This is evident 
in the consumer credit sector, where the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) sets out a 
detailed framework for disclosing information about prices, terms and conditions.[53] To a 
large extent, providers can structure and price their products as they like, as long as the 
disclosure requirements in the UCCC are met.  
However, a focus on facilitating competition and information disclosure does not address 
issues of financial exclusion. As we discussed above, financially excluded consumers are not 
seen as attractive by mainstream lenders and, in this context, no amount of competition will 
induce lenders to meet their needs. Excluding the application of discrimination laws, there are 
no legal or other obligations imposed on mainstream lenders to provide services to any 
individual consumer, and governments have been reluctant to impose such an obligation. For 
example, efforts to seek government support for legislative requirements upon banks to 
provide a basic banking account for low income and vulnerable consumers were 
unsuccessful[54]; although, interestingly, many institutions have now introduced such an 
account. 
Relying on well-informed consumers choosing between various product offerings in the 
market to address the issues of financial exclusion is also problematic. Studies have 
suggested borrowers of fringe lenders do not fully appreciate the costs of the credit[55] and 
do little or no shopping around between different lenders.[56] There is little price advertising 
by fringe lenders in Australia and, as far as we are aware, no external sources providing 
comparison information for the majority of fringe lending products in Australia.[57] 
Customers of fringe lenders rarely discover the cost of credit until they are at the point of sale 
and, by this time, they are likely to have psychologically committed to the transaction and are 
unlikely to take away this price information to compare with another lender. This tendency is 
compounded if the borrower is under pressure to obtain finance and/or feels that no other 
lender will assist, as is the case for many financially excluded consumers.[58]  
In addition, a competitive market potentially creates risks for vulnerable or disadvantaged 
consumers in particular. For example, a market that is fully competitive from a classical 
economic perspective is one that has ‘low barriers to entry, low sunk costs, many rivals, and 
rapid rates of entry and exit’.[59] However, the ease of entry and exit can also facilitate the 
emergence of unscrupulous operators, as has happened in the credit market. 
Finally, beyond the prohibition against unjust transactions[60] and some provisions dealing 
with the terms of credit contracts,[61] competition models and the UCCC do not impose any 
obligations to provide credit products that are both fair and safe for potential borrowers. 
Without these characteristics, financial exclusion cannot be adequately addressed. 
Despite a heavy focus on competition and competitive markets to provide outcomes for 
consumers, some Australian States and Territories have retained controls on the cost of credit 
through prescribing maximum interest rates for consumer loans.[62] In theory, such 
mechanisms should force out the very high-cost products from the market, but they do not 
make excluded consumers any more attractive to mainstream lenders. Critics of interest rate 
caps also suggest that they in fact harm, rather than protect, low-income and vulnerable 
consumers.[63] In addition, interest rate caps can be easily avoided, by loading additional 
costs into the largely unregulated additional fees and charges.[64]  
In Australia, there is no regulator or government agency with responsibility for ensuring 
access to financial services or for addressing financial exclusion, and governments do not 
seem to have acknowledged the essential nature of financial services. However, in its recently 
announced review of consumer credit, the Victorian government has committed to working 
with credit providers to ‘improve access to affordable finance for disadvantaged groups’, and 
the review issues paper suggests that the government will take seriously any potential 
solutions that might encourage mainstream lenders to provide affordable microfinance and 
thus reduce financial exclusion.[65] 
B The Application of Consumer Protection Theory to Fringe Credit 
One clear example of the inadequacy of disclosure regulation as a form of consumer 
protection is the attempt to regulate fringe credit providers simply by bringing them within 
the jurisdiction of the UCCC. Before 2001, many fringe lenders had not been regulated under 
the UCCC, which did not apply to loans for periods of less than 62 days. Under the 2001 
amendments[66] the 62 day threshold still applies, but only where fees and charges do not 
exceed 5% of the loan amount and the interest rate does not exceed 24% per annum.[67] This 
means that most fringe loans will be subject to the disclosure provisions of the UCCC. As we 
have argued, however, this form of ‘disclosure regulation’[68] will be ineffective given the 
evidence that vulnerable consumers do not regard themselves as having any choice but to 
borrow at high interest rates.[69] The current regulatory focus on disclosure requirements in 
protecting consumers who access credit through fringe lenders seems misconceived, given 
that low-income earners without real choice are unlikely to be influenced by the fees and 
charges disclosed in accepting a loan offer.[70] It has been noted in relation to disclosure 
regulation generally that 
the risks associated with some products or activities may be so great that policy-makers may 
feel that it is inappropriate merely to inform affected parties about those matters and 
command and control methods may be deemed necessary.[71]  
These comments would seem particularly applicable to fringe credit. 
Further in relation to the inadequacy of the current regulatory response, the ability of 
borrowers to apply under the UCCC[72] to reopen unjust transactions or review 
unconscionable or other interest charges is unlikely to assist low-income consumers who will 
tend not to have the resources nor inclination to bring applications before a court or 
tribunal.[73] 
In terms of an appropriate regulatory response, the ‘conduct’ of this industry must lead us to 
conclude that models of self-regulation or enforced self-regulation would not be adequate. As 
noted in a report to the Queensland Minister for Fair Trading in 2000, voluntary codes of 
conduct rely on there being a strong industry body, peer pressure from participants within the 
industry and a fear of ostracism from the industry body. In relation to payday lenders it was 
noted that 
Each market participant seemed to be interested only in ensuring the growth and strength of 
its own organisation, as is normal in fledgling industries, with little consideration of its fellow 
market participants.[74]  
‘Command and control’ models of regulation through legislation imposing strict penalties for 
exploitative lending practices, whilst perhaps also providing incentives for providing 
financial products to low-income consumers at reasonable rates and on reasonable repayment 
terms, should be considered.  
Further research will be required to answer the question as to whether fringe credit providers, 
such as payday lenders, should be allowed to continue to service low-income consumers, on 
the basis that regulation could be enacted which would facilitate and require the provision of 
loans by them on reasonable and fair terms. Their ability to provide such loans profitably 
seems a crucial question, as is the likelihood of their commitment to lending on fair and non-
exploitative terms. Many argue vehemently that there is no place in the market for these 
lenders, who have been described as exploitative and predatory.[75] There is no doubt that 
many low-income consumers who use the services of these lenders find themselves in a ‘debt 
spiral’ from which it can be impossible to escape. Nevertheless, fringe credit providers seem 
to provide a service which is in demand and which has captured a market, in the absence of 
any current viable alternative. In considering the role of fringe credit providers in addressing 
financial exclusion, a determination needs to be made as to whether these credit providers are 
capable of assisting to address financial exclusion under an appropriate regulatory structure, 
or whether they can only exacerbate the problem. If the latter is the case, then a regulatory 
ban would seem to be the only feasible option.  
IV FINANCIAL REGULATION 
A Regulatory Limits on the Role of Credit Unions 
Historically, credit unions have been the perfect vehicle for solving the needs of a community 
for affordable finance. The union was formed, and members pooled their savings and were 
able to borrow from the pool at affordable rates. The credit unions were established as mutual 
organisations in the sense of being owned by those who saved with and borrowed from them. 
Many credit unions have now succumbed to what has been termed the ‘demutualisation 
feeding frenzy’[76] whereby the credit unions cease to be member-owned mutual 
organisations and members’ interests convert to shares in a proprietary limited company. 
Further, the current regulatory environment is said to hinder the establishment of new credit 
unions at grass roots levels, and to prevent existing credit unions from performing their 
traditional roles as providers of affordable credit within communities. Race Mathews argues 
that 
What is needed is a recognition from government - preferably explicit - that credit unionism 
is about enabling ordinary people and communities to engage in self-help, and thereby is 
entitled to special consideration … This means getting rid as much as possible of the 
statutory and regulatory requirements which are blocking the establishment of new credit 
unions, cramping the development of current credit unions or inhibiting them from striking 
out in new directions in response to new needs, and obliging communities which have been 
deserted by the major commercial banks to establish community banks as a second-best 
substitute for credit unions.[77]  
This has been well-articulated and accepted in the UK, where the Department of Trade and 
Industry has suggested that one way of minimising the problem of over-indebtedness is to 
ensure that low-income consumers have access to affordable credit and that credit unions 
have a role to play in this. The Department recognises that ‘the credit union ethos of thrift, 
financial planning and self-help, together with their ability to offer access to affordable loans, 
means they are well placed to make an important contribution to tackling financial 
exclusion’.[78] 
In the UK, therefore, credit unions have been granted an exemption from the Banking 
Directives and the UK Banking Acts, notwithstanding that they are able to accept deposits. 
This has been described as a ‘significant exception and entirely justified since credit unions 
offer competition to banks in savings and credit, particularly (but not exclusively) in savings 
and credit for social purposes’.[79] 
It is notable that in Australia, since the enactment of the Australian Financial Institutions 
Commission Act 1992, only three new credit unions have formed.[80] One of these is an 
example of the good that can be achieved within communities by the establishment of a credit 
union. The Traditional Credit Union, which was incorporated in December 1994, with 
branches in remote parts of Australia, serves a membership comprised predominantly of 
Indigenous people on low incomes. Its services include savings, budget and Christmas club 
accounts, clan accounts for joint saving, personal loans of up to $10,000 and small business 
loans of up to $15,000.[81] 
The problem in Australia with respect to regulation of credit unions seems to be a failure to 
recognise the differences between credit unions and banks, treating credit unions for 
regulatory purposes as if they are banks.[82] It is argued that, by imposing the same capital 
adequacy requirements on credit unions, the potential for them to form and grow is lost, and 
management is required to focus upon financial targets which are not necessarily consistent 
with the mutual goals of credit unions.[83] The mutual nature of credit unions has been 
largely ignored by regulators. 
B The Contribution of Community Organisations 
The work to facilitate reasonable access to short term credit by low-income consumers being 
undertaken by mutual societies such as Foresters ANA, and community organisations such as 
Good Shepherd Youth and Family Services and Brotherhood of St Laurence, could also be 
expanded upon by removal of certain regulatory hurdles. Foresters ANA, for example, has 
fostered the development of savings and loans circles in Queensland, whereby small groups 
of people meet regularly and contribute savings to a pool (often initiated with seed funding 
from a community organisation), which pool is available to members of the group after a 
certain period of time in the form of no-interest loans.[84] Difficulties might arise, however, 
if an organisation such as Foresters sought to expand on the savings and loans idea and itself 
administer the collection of savings and the making of loans. It might then be regarded as 
conducting a deposit-taking business which, pursuant to the Banking Act 1959 (Cth),[85] 
would be regarded as ‘banking business’ that may only be undertaken by authorised deposit-
taking institutions - that is, banks, building societies and credit unions authorised to conduct 
banking business by the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority. The same hurdle would 
be encountered by Good Shepherd Youth and Family Services if it wished to extend its No 
Interest Loans Scheme[86] to enable low income consumers who had completed payments on 
their no-interest loans, to continue to make payments by way of savings to allow for future 
financial emergencies. The possibility for such initiatives should surely be encouraged not 
hindered by regulation. 
Credit unions, other mutual societies and community organisations have a crucial role to play 
in addressing the problem of financial exclusion in Australia, and financial regulation needs 
to be responsive to that, with regulators taking into account ‘the conduct of those they seek to 
regulate in deciding whether a more or less interventionist response is needed’,[87] and then 
commencing with the least interventionist regulatory response, moving only to a more 
interventionist one when that fails.[88] In short, regulatory theory would suggest that the 
regulatory rope should be loosened from the necks of credit unions, mutual societies and 
community organisations on the basis that their ‘conduct’ in providing savings and credit 
facilities for social purposes should invoke a minimal regulatory response, enabling those 
organisations to contribute to overcoming financial exclusion to the greatest extent of their 
potential, while still leaving adequate consumer protection measures in place. 
C Corporate Law as a Limitation on the Contribution of Banks 
As we noted above, mainstream institutions such as banks have largely deserted the small 
loan market. However, in response to community concerns about high-cost credit in the 
fringe market, we are now seeing a number of the major banks dip their toes back in this 
market. 
For example, in 2004 the National Australia Bank, in partnership with the Good Shepherd 
Youth and Family Service, piloted a low-interest loan product, the Step-Up Loan. 
Step Up Loan is a National product facilitated by Good Shepherd Youth and Family Service. 
These personal, unsecured loans are between $800 and $3000 for individuals and families 
living on a low income and are offered at a reduced interest rate of 6.9%. The loans provide 
affordable credit for the purchase of essential household goods and services (eg. refrigerators, 
washing machines, beds etc). In addition, repaying a Step Up Low Interest Loan establishes a 
credit rating and an entry into the mainstream credit system.[89]  
In addition to obtaining a low-interest loan, borrowers are mentored through the loan process 
and repayment period, and thus have access to support and further information. However, the 
Step Up Loan is being piloted in only five locations in Victoria and NSW, and it is not known 
if and when it will be made more widely available. Indeed, the fact that borrowers are 
mentored by a micro-credit worker throughout the loan period suggests that it might be 
difficult and expensive to roll out such a loan product on a more extensive basis. 
Following the release of its discussion paper on community development finance[90] and its 
commissioned research on financial exclusion,[91] ANZ Bank has also committed to develop 
and deliver, in partnership with relevant organisations: 
• a small loan program for consumers who may otherwise use payday lenders; and 
• microfinance programs to assist Indigenous communities develop viable businesses.[92] 
In addition to developing their own pilot projects, some of the major banks financially 
support the No Interest Loan schemes offered by community organisations.[93] 
These initiatives might be viewed as examples of voluntary ‘corporate social responsibility’ 
(CSR). There is no doubt that these initiatives, which largely involve partnerships between 
banks and community organisations, are valuable and could provide a framework for more 
extensive participation by banks in this area.[94] At this stage, however, these initiatives are 
on a small scale, have very limited geographic coverage and eligibility requirements,[95] and 
barely make a dent in overcoming financial exclusion. We will argue here that corporate law, 
and its mandate that directors act in the best financial interests of shareholders, limits the 
extent of any initiatives undertaken by way of voluntary corporate social responsibility, and 
will prevent these initiatives from expanding to any desirable level without external 
regulation to both require and permit their expansion. 
Company directors are under a duty to act in the best interests of the company under 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 181 and under general fiduciary principles. The company has 
been defined in this regard to mean ‘the shareholders as a whole’[96] or, where a company is 
insolvent, ‘the creditors’.[97] In either case, it is the financial interests of those groups – as 
linked to the company’s financial interests – that are regarded as relevant. This would seem to 
preclude an exercise of discretion by directors in favour of social welfare, unless some clear 
benefit to shareholders in terms of financial return can be demonstrated. Put another way, 
directors will potentially breach their duty to act in the best interests of shareholders if they 
exercise social responsibility in a manner that might impact on profits.  
This understanding was reflected in the comments made by a spokesperson for the Australian 
Shareholder’s Association in January 2005, criticising corporate donations to aid tsunami 
relief, stating that 
firms should not generally give without expecting something in return … in most 
circumstances, donations should only be made in situations that are likely to benefit the 
company through greater market exposure.[98]  
This is consistent with Milton Friedman’s view that ‘corporate expenditure on social causes 
is a violation of management’s responsibility to shareholders to the extent that the 
expenditures do not lead to higher shareholder wealth’.[99] Australian case law confirms this 
position, but notes that, where an exercise of social responsibility or philanthropy can benefit 
the company - for example, by improving the company’s reputation - then such acts can be 
justified. 
A company may decide to be generous with those with whom it deals. But – we put the 
matter in general terms – it may be generous to do more than it need do only if, essentially, it 
be for the benefit of or for the purposes of the company that it do such. It may be felt 
inappropriate that the company acquire a reputation of being such.[100] 
The social expectation that companies will behave as good corporate citizens and exercise 
voluntary corporate social responsibility often seems to conflict with the legal requirements 
on boards of directors. This was very apparent in comments made by the chair of the board of 
the James Hardie group of companies, Meredith Hellicar, in response to criticisms of the 
group’s restructure, which saw a separation of the group’s ongoing asbestos liabilities from 
the balance sheet of group companies, leaving a shortfall in funds available to meet those 
liabilities. She commented: 
In considering the sometimes competing - or even conflicting - requirements of the law, 
community expectations and our own moral precepts, we did not respond with offers of 
funding support for any shortfall of the foundation.[101]  
There is little doubt that, in contributing to overcoming problems of financial exclusion, the 
boards of banks are mindful of their responsibilities to shareholders and will limit their 
contributions to what might be termed ‘strategic’ corporate social responsibility - that is, 
CSR, which enhances reputation and therefore contributes to shareholder wealth. Taking a 
more cynical view, Joel Bakan argues that CSR is no more than an attempt by corporations to 
improve their reputations and hide their true, self-interested natures. 
Corporate social responsibility is their new creed, a self-conscious corrective to earlier greed-
inspired visions of the corporation. Despite this shift, the corporation itself has not changed. 
It remains, as it was at the time of its origins as a modern business institution in the middle of 
the nineteenth century, a legally designated ‘person’ designed to valorise self-interest and 
invalidate moral concern.[102] 
It seems clear that, despite the best intentions of individuals working within the corporate 
structure of banks, banks will be unable to contribute to the financial inclusion of low-income 
consumers to any greater extent than is necessary for strategic purposes such as improving 
their corporate reputation, without clear and effective regulation to allow and require their 
more meaningful contribution. Relying on voluntary CSR initiatives will never be enough.  
The nature of the regulatory response that should follow needs careful consideration. The 
enactment of legislation such as the US Community Reinvestment Act[103] has been 
recommended for the consideration of the Commonwealth Treasury by the Parliamentary 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services.[104] Under that Act there is periodic 
evaluation of the performance of financial institutions in meeting the credit needs of the 
communities in which they maintain branches, including the needs of low- and moderate-
income consumers. That record is taken into account in considering an institution’s 
application for deposit facilities, including in the case of proposed mergers and 
acquisitions.[105] Notwithstanding the absence of such legislation in the UK, banks in 
England are reporting to the Bank of England on a voluntary basis along the lines required 
under the Community Reinvestment Act. The engagements of banks in addressing financial 
exclusion, and their related reporting, seem to have been spurred on by the threat of 
legislation.[106] It is likely that banks in Australia have been similarly spurred on to action in 
the interests of regulatory risk management, due to the threat of legislation such as the 
Community Reinvestment Act. Arguably, therefore, some risk of legislative intervention may 
be necessary to maintain and increase the participation of banks in this area. In terms of the 
responsiveness of regulation, however, regulatory theorists have suggested that the most 
suitable form of regulation will depend upon context, and upon the conduct of the industry in 
question: 
regulation should respond to industry conduct, to how effectively industry is making private 
regulation work. The very behaviour of an industry or the firms therein should channel the 
regulatory strategy to greater or lesser degrees of government intervention.[107]  
We have given reasons as to why relying on voluntary corporate social responsibility, a form 
of self-regulation, will not be enough, and we have suggested that some form of public 
sanction such as under the Community Reinvestment Act, may be necessary to achieve the 
desired level of banks’ participation in the effort to overcome financial exclusion in Australia. 
That said, in taking into account the recent conduct of most of the major banks in 
contributing in this area, a less interventionist model than that involved in enacting 
community reinvestment legislation might be more appropriate. An alternative to the 
Community Reinvestment Act model would be a model of ‘enforced self-regulation’, which 
can be described as the public enforcement of privately written rules.[108] One key 
difference between this and the enactment of community reinvestment legislation is that this 
model would be based upon industry members writing their own regulatory rules, perhaps by 
amending the Code of Banking Practice 2003, which would then be approved by a relevant 
regulator such as the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority or the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission[109] and be enforceable by that regulator if those rules were 
not voluntarily complied with. It is suggested that the enforcement mechanism would need to 
be more effective than that provided by the existing Code Compliance Monitoring 
Committee, which may prove to be a ‘toothless tiger’ given that its ultimate enforcement 
mechanism consists of ‘punishing’ banks by naming them in its annual report.[110] The 
advantages of ‘enforced self-regulation’ include firstly, the opportunity for banks to 
internalise ethical standards and concepts of community service obligations, rather than 
obligations being externally imposed upon them. An external imposition of obligations might 
lead to banks seeking to avoid those obligations. Under this model it is more likely that banks 
will be committed to meeting those obligations. Secondly, the rules written by industry 
members might be well informed and therefore more effective and appropriate.[111] In 
relation to the regulation of mainstream financial institutions in this manner, however, it is 
acknowledged that further investigation is necessary to determine precisely upon which 
mainstream financial institutions any such obligations should be imposed.  
V CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have explored the phenomenon of financial exclusion in Australia, with a 
particular focus on financial exclusion in the consumer credit market. Although definitions of 
financial exclusion vary, we have sought to explain the concept in light of concerns about 
access to fair, safe and affordable products from mainstream providers. We argue that short-
term consumer credit should be treated as an essential service, particularly for low income 
and vulnerable consumers. Without access to products in the mainstream market, these 
consumers are largely restricted to either the fringe credit market, where products are often 
high-cost and fail to meet the criteria of affordable, fair and safe, or to the no-interest loan 
products offered by community and welfare organisations – these products are affordable, 
fair and safe, but are not widely available, nor widely publicised. 
It is difficult to measure with any certainty the extent of financial exclusion in Australia, but 
there is evidence to suggest that it is a growing problem, and that the impacts of financial 
exclusion can be serious and long-lasting, for individuals, their families and the broader 
community. Similarly, it is difficult to isolate an individual factor that drives financial 
exclusion. Instead, there are a variety of personal and commercial/marketplace factors that 
can work together to drive financial exclusion, with the result that there is unlikely to be one 
simple solution to eliminating it.  
We have sought to show how the regulatory framework also has a major impact on the extent 
or otherwise of financial exclusion in Australia. The regulatory framework relies heavily on 
competition and disclosure to protect consumers; however, in the absence of an obligation to 
supply, these approaches do not create incentives for mainstream suppliers to provide 
services to financially excluded consumers. Disclosure initiatives are also limited, given the 
personal and practical constraints facing financially excluded consumers in need of finance. 
As an example, we have argued that the disclosure and other requirements in the UCCC do 
not ensure that fringe lenders are obliged to provide fair, safe and affordable loans to 
financially excluded consumers. 
The regulatory framework also places significant barriers in front of industry or community 
organisations that are trying to develop effective ways of meeting the needs of financial 
excluded consumers. The treatment of all financial services providers as the same does not 
allow credit unions to develop a different, more effective approach. And there are also risks 
for community organisations seeking to meet client needs, if, for example, their products 
amount to deposit-taking products and require regulation. In terms of mainstream providers, 
obligations to shareholders imposed through the Corporations Act severely limit the extent to 
which micro-finance products can be offered if they are not profitable in isolation.  
Although the regulatory framework is not the only mechanism for addressing financial 
exclusion in Australia, it can play a vital role. Reform to corporate, financial services and 
consumer credit regulation is needed to: 
• create space for the development of voluntary initiatives by both community and for-profit 
organisations without the fear of inappropriate regulation; 
• explore ways in which corporate social responsibility can be better accommodated within 
existing corporate structures;  
• impose obligations on mainstream providers to meet the finance needs of financially 
excluded consumers; and 
• ensure that exploitative products are simply not available in the marketplace.  
Without such changes, many consumers will continue to be financially excluded, at 
considerable cost to themselves, their families and the broader community. 
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